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The Effectiveness of Political Violence in Social Movements
Angelica Tsvetkov, Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
This paper will be assessing the effectiveness of utilizing political violence versus
nonviolence to attain political goals for groups within social movements with a particular focus
on disadvantaged insurgent, opposition, and secessionist movements. To do so, it will examine
the non-violent and violent schools of thought in political philosophy to assess the moral and
pragmatic considerations of both strategies. It will also examine how the utilization of these
opposing strategies can affect the likelihood of a social movement achieving its political goals.
Political goals are the goals social movements are working to achieve through protest and mass
mobilization so that they may impact policy or achieve the social change they are hoping to
enact (i.e. regime change, implementation of public policy, abolishment of an institution, the
protection of civil rights, etc. ). In order to comprehensively assess whether political violence is a
more effective tool to achieve political goals for social movements than nonviolent strategies,
this paper will not limit itself to the trends of the United States. Instead, it will utilize a
comparative approach to ask: is political violence a more effective strategy for groups within
social movements to attain political goals than nonviolent strategies?
Introduction
Much of the previous literature on studying political violence has largely focused on
determining why groups rebel, why political violence has increased, how radicalization has been
addressed, and how social movement theory can be used to de-exceptionalize violence by
locating it within broader contexts and complex processes (Breen-Smyth, 2012). However, there
is a lingering question that has been posed and examined for a long time but not yet answered
in a manner that is complete: is political violence a morally justifiable and effective strategy for
attaining political policy goals for groups that are a part of social movements?
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We have all heard the popular phrase: “violence is not the answer.” Although this
phrase appeals to our moral sensibilities, it stands in juxtaposition with a large array of
literature which suggests that for justice to come to fruition for disadvantaged groups,
sometimes violence must be the answer for them, as they utilize it as a strategy to achieve
their political goals. For a long time, there was a growing consensus that violent methods were
being selected by opposition movements because they were much more efficient than
non-violent strategies at achieving political goals (Pape, 2005).
However, despite this perspective temporarily taking on the prevailing view, a new
perspective soon began to emerge and combat it, one of non-violence. New studies began to
emerge suggesting that non-violence was more efficient at achieving political goals than
violent methods. Although the philosophy of non-violence was not new, new data had shown
that it was more efficient than violent strategies at achieving political objectives (Stephan &
Chenoweth, 2008). However, there is not currently one prevailing view that either is more
effective. While theoretical and empirical research has been growing extensively on this topic,
there has been little attention given to the outcome and effectiveness of political violence as a
strategy for groups to attain political goals.
There are several reasons as to why this research is valuable. First, the study of
asymmetric conflicts is valuable to nation-states, like the U.S., which need to be able to
assess the risks of groups within social movements that may potentially utilize nonviolent or
violent strategies to protest against it (Arreguín-Toft, 2005). This research will help such
nation-states and political institutions identify which groups and movements possess the
highest threat to their security and interests. Second, groups that utilize non-violent or violent
methods within social movements do so because they are in a disadvantaged position within
their society (Ginsberg, 2013;Koos, 2014). Historically, these material, social, and political
disadvantages have created the assumption that these disadvantaged groups are bound to
lose against powerful political institutions and nation-states with or without political violence.
Lastly, answering this research question will show the realistic capacity these groups will
have at achieving political goals based on statistical advantages and disadvantages found in
this research literature. This research can be a resource to oppressed groups that are a part
of insurgent movements so that they may know whether the methods of political violence or
non-violence are more effective in achieving their desired political goals.
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Literature Review
This paper will first define the relevant concepts that are related to the study of
political violence and nonviolence. Then it will discuss the common moral and philosophical
arguments that are used to justify political violence versus nonviolence. Afterwards, it will
review the existing body of literature that has explored the topic of whether political violence
has been efficient and effective at achieving political goals for opposition movements.
When referring to political violence throughout this paper, the distinction should be
made that I am not referring to random acts of violence committed by non-political groups.
Instead, political violence will refer to violence that is enacted by groups who are a part of an
existing social movement(s) that have broad political goals that they aim to attain. It is the
strategic use of violence against nation-states, political bodies, and institutions with the
intended purpose of enacting political change in a way that aligns with their principles, values,
or calls to action for policy change.
Nonviolence, sometimes called non-resistance, refers to a strategy emphasizing not
utilizing violence during political action and protest (Howes, 2013). There are two branches of
nonviolence: principled and strategic. Advocates of principled nonviolence will suggest that
there are times where violence can be utilized to protect innocent people. Advocates of strategic
nonviolence are pure pacifists; they suggest that there are always better alternatives to violence
even in the most extreme circumstances. Examples of different activities that encompass the
term nonviolent action include social noncooperation, boycotts, strikes, political noncooperation,
nonviolent intervention (Howes, 2013). While there are distinctions which exist amongst
advocates of nonviolence, the most important difference that needs to be known for this paper is
that even when advocates of nonviolence utilize violence it is only used as a defense tactic. On
the other hand, advocates of political violence utilize it as a strategic tool against their
opposition.
The Philosophical Implications of Political Violence
Before we explore the efficiency and the effectiveness of political violence, it is important
to first examine the moral arguments that exist for and against it. I must point out that if a
political strategy is not morally justifiable in practice then it must not be used, no matter how
efficient or effective it is. Assessing whether the use of political violence is morally permissible is
important because it allows us to establish whether this is a strategy that should even be utilized
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in practice, even if I conclude that it is highly effective in my research. That is why in this section
I will explore some of the common moral arguments that are often made for and against the use
of political violence.
There are three main moral arguments that are often made against political violence,
even when political violence is necessary for proper political communication and protest (Kling
& Mitchell, 2019). First, violent protesters fail to respect others within the opposition party,
regime, or institution and unfairly target people who are not individually responsible for all the
injustice that has been dealt through an institution that they are a part of. Second, protesters fail
to respect these individuals because they use them as a means to an end. Third, those who
utilize political violence to achieve their political goals within social movements unfairly
disadvantage non-violent protests by putting them at risk of violence at the hands of the
opposition party.
This paper will briefly lay out the arguments that have countered the legitimacy of those
arguments. In regard to the first claim, even if individual members of an unjust regime, party, or
institution have not committed unjust acts themselves, if they are a part of an unjust system
they have then forfeited their rights to safety and security. Being a part of an unjust institution
means that they are not innocent bystanders but instead that they are active members of an
oppressive institution and regime (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). However, it is important to make the
distinction that assaulting and harming actors of oppressive institutions is only justified if these
actors are furthering an injustice which is at issue within a social movement group.
For instance, let us use the example of the Black Lives Matter movement that has had
demonstrations all across the world to protest police brutality and systemic racism. It is morally
permissible for protestors (especially Black protestors) to use violent strategies against the
police, strategies that would not usually be morally acceptable to use against ordinary people.
It is appropriate for protestors to view the officers as morally responsible for the threat that they
impose on the Black community. Because the oppressive institution of policing directly
threatens the bodily integrity of Black citizens, the protestors targeting oppressive actors (law
enforcement) is fair (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). Even if individual police officers are ignorant and
unaware of law enforcement’s injustice towards all Black Americans, they are still morally
complicit because they are acting on behalf of the oppressive institution.
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Furthermore, it is important to note once again that this argument only allows violent
protest against those who are reasonably viewed by the protesting social movement group as
furthering the injustice of the issue that is the reason for protest. This argument does not
suggest that it is morally permissible to randomly kill individual law enforcement officers. Killing
individual law enforcement officers is not necessary for political messaging purposes or for
achieving the political goals of the social movement group (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). In this case,
the goal of ending police brutality and systemic racism. Not only is lethal violence unnecessary
but it can also do more harm than good. While non-lethal violence can sometimes enhance
communication, lethal violence rules out the possibility of political communication in a way that
non-lethal violence does not (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). Therefore, not only is lethal violence not
effective but it is also not morally permissible in most cases of political protest.
In response to the second claim, the use of limited violence against unjust oppositional
actors is not a failure to respect their individuality or humanity. The unjust oppositional actors
are not being used merely as a means to an end for political communicative purposes. In
actuality, protestors are respecting and acknowledging the power and autonomy individuals
possess by holding them responsible for their unjust actions. I will continue to use the example
of the Black Lives Matter movement protests to illustrate this point. When protestors engage in
certain non-lethal acts of violence against police officers they are treating the officers as agents
who are capable of acting with discretion. Police officers make a conscious decision to join and
continue to be a part of an oppressive institution. Protestors are holding officers responsible for
the unjust institutions that they have chosen to be the arm of which pose an unjust threat to
Black communities (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). They are being fair because they are accurately
targeting an unjust threat and they are being respectful because they are holding people
responsible for actions that they have chosen to do.
In regards to the third claim, nonviolent actors are already at risk of provoking violent
retaliation because they intentionally utilize protest tactics - strikes, demonstrations, boycotts,
etc. - to create political and social disruption, they often anticipate that there will be violent
responses from their opponents (Ginsberg, 2013). For instance, this was the case with
nonviolent movement leaders like Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi in their use of
peaceful protests. Additionally, it is not the fault of violent protesters that an opposition party
would respond with violence, this would put blame onto the victims of unjust violence. The
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opposition group, often an unjust nation-state or institution, has the capacity to utilize
de-escalation strategies (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). Therefore, the moral blame of non-violent
protestors being harmed through the use of violence is not on violent protestors but rather the
opposition group.
The Efficiency and Effectiveness of Political Violence
Now that I have laid out the different moral groundings which lay at the foundation of
these different protest strategies, I will explore whether insurgent movements are ever able to
win in asymmetric conflicts against stronger actors. For a long time people believed that if there
was a military, material, or power imbalance between state and insurgent movement that the
state would always likely win. However, in 1975 a research article by Andrew Mack countered
this prevalent assumption. Mack (1975) was the first to develop a general theory on why strong
nations lose small wars and developed the concept of ‘asymmetric conflict,’ it took over a
quarter century for there to be a rival explanation to his claim. His study showed that weaker
actors have won fifty one percent of all asymmetric wars since 1950 and it suggested that there
are three elements which explain how weak states can win asymmetric wars (Mack, 1975).
These three elements include: (1) relative power explaining relative interests; (2) relative
interests explain relative political vulnerability; and (3) relative vulnerability explains why strong
actors can lose to weaker actors (Mack, 1975). The first element suggests that stronger actors
often have a lower interest in winning asymmetric conflicts because their survival is not at stake
while weaker actors have very high levels of interests because their ability to win secures their
ability to survive.
The second element, political vulnerability, explains why weak actors can win in
asymmetric conflicts. Weak actor’s have a high interest and this causes them to have high
political vulnerability while the strong actor’s low interest is related to low political vulnerability.
If conflict between these two actors prolongs for too long, it eventually causes political elites
and the public to become weary and to oppose the government's involvement in such conflicts
which in some cases forces them to withdraw because of internal dissent (Mack, 1975). This
makes stronger actors more vulnerable relative to insurgent movements. Mack (1975) draws
upon anti-war movements within the U.S., specifically the Vietnam war, to show that while
social movements can have many short-term failures they can be incredibly successful in the
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long term (p. 177-189).
In 2005, a research article written by Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft (2005) solidified Mack’s
major claim; it showed that weaker actors have won fifty one percent of all asymmetric wars
since 1950. However, Arreguín-Toft was also the first to offer a rival explanation to what the key
causal mechanism is in conflicts. While Mack (1975) suggested that interest asymmetry is the
key causal mechanism in the outcome of such conflicts, Arreguín-Toft (2005) suggested that the
real causal mechanism is strategic interaction. He suggested that when strategic interaction
causes an unexpected delay between the commitment of armed forces or the attainment of
political objectives, strong actors tend to lose for two reasons. First, strong actors in asymmetric
conflicts tend to have inflated expectations of victory. However, in many cases as protest and
war drags on strong actors tend to look incompetent and it causes there to be a domestic
pressure which asks governments to end the conflict (Arreguín-Toft, 2005). An abandonment of
opposition to political protest is a win on the part of insurgent movements and it causes strong
actors to have to concede, often with policy changes.
Additionally, strong actors lose asymmetric wars because as they try to avoid the
increasing costs of conflict, they employ barbarism, which is the violation of laws of war in order
to attain a political or military objective (Arreguín-Toft, 2005). Barbarism enacted by a strong
actor not only creates internal domestic pressure to end the conflict, but it also increases the
chances of external (international) intervention to support insurgent movements. Therefore,
Arreguín-Toft’s (2005) research not only supported Mack’s (1975) central claim, but it further
legitimized it through a more substantive and logical theory. This research among political
scientists created the prevailing view that opposition movements select violent methods
because they are more effective than nonviolent strategies because they are better at achieving
political goals.
However, this prevailing view was challenged by a study in 2008 which suggested
that non-violent resistance methods are more successful than violent methods at achieving
political goals, utilizing large-n comparative case studies of nonviolent campaigns in
Southeast Asia (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). This study filled a gap in the literature at the
time by exploring the strategic effectiveness of violent and non-violent campaigns in conflicts
between state and nonstate actors by evaluating data on major violent and nonviolent
campaigns from 1900 to 2006. Their findings showed that major nonviolent campaigns were
able to be successful fifty three percent of the time, compared to the twenty six percent of
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successes of violent resistance campaigns (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). When the
researchers stated that certain campaigns were successful they were suggesting that these
campaigns were able to achieve their strategic political objectives. For example, widespread
and decentralized mobilization for their movement, producing meaningful loyalty shifts
among opponent elites, security forces, and civilians, and policy or regime changes that
aligned with their movements demands and political goals.
Two examples that are referenced that fall under these parameters of success in their
research are the nonviolent campaigns in East Timor and the Philippines. From 1988-1999
nonviolent protests in East Timor were able to set the stage for mass mobilization, demand
an end to the corrupt Suharto military dictatorship, and force the Indonesian government to
withdraw from East Timor under supervision (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Violent
campaigns were only able to mobilize a maximum of 1,500 fighters while the nonviolent
campaign produced thousands of participants. Similarly, The nonviolent campaign in the
Philippines in 1986 was able to result in mass mobilization, civilian and security force loyalty
shifts, and international pressure for the regime controlled by the Philippine dictator
Ferdinand Marcos to concede defeat (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).
This study suggested that there were two major reasons as to why nonviolent resistance
campaigns have a strategic advantage over violent resistance. First, when a state actor, the
opposition group in relation to the resistance group, represses a nonviolent campaign it often
backfires both internally and externally on the state actor. Internally, members of a regime - civil
servants, the courts, etc. - are more likely to be loyal to nonviolent opposition groups than
violent opposition groups. The power of a resistance campaign is its ability to defect members
of a regime and to create mass mobilization towards its intended political goals, building
allegiance and loyalty among its ranks (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Therefore, nonviolence is
more successful as a strategy because it is able to create divisions amongst regime supporters
when there is a mass nonviolent civil resistance movement.
Externally, other countries are more likely to denounce a repressive regime and use
sanctions on it when a state is oppressing nonviolent campaigns than for violent campaigns.
Nonviolent campaigns are also more likely to receive external aid from the international
community. However, this support may not advance the cause of the campaign. On the other
hand, when there are violent campaigns within a state, there is also a higher chance that
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external actors from the international community may actually help repressive regimes combat
the work of violent groups (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008).
The second reason is that nonviolent campaigns seem more willing to compromise and
engage in negotiation because they are not threatening the health and lives of individuals of the
oppressive regime (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). This factor makes nonviolent campaigns
more appealing to those within the regime and to the mass public as well. This crucial factor
gives an advantage to nonviolent resistance strategies over violent resistance strategies
because public support and the possibility of loyalty shifts is crucial to the success of any
resistance movement. As proven by the previously mentioned studies, when there is internal
dissent of a state’s repression tactics towards an insurgent movement there is a higher chance
that the state will have to concede to the insurgent movement's demands (Arreguín-Toft, 2005;
Mack, 1975).
Studies have shown that groups that utilize violent political protest are perceived as less
reasonable and the mass public is less likely to identify with the group (Simpson, Willer, &
Feinberg, 2018). This of course results in less public support for the violent group which lessens
the chance of success for the group to achieve its political goals. Additionally, when violent
campaigns threaten the lives of regime members and law enforcement, they reduce the
possibility of loyalty shifts (Stephan & Chenoweth, 2008). Moreover, violent campaigns that
threaten civilians lose even more public support when they are compared to campaigns that
limit their violent targeting to the police or the military. (Abrahms, 2006).
Since this study was published, researchers have built upon its foundation to further
substantiate and legitimize the claim that nonviolent strategies are more effective than violent
strategies. Kurk Schock conducted a comparative study of unarmed insurrections in the
Philippines, Burma, Thailand, South Africa, and Nepal (Schock, 2013). He found that
nonviolence campaigns are able to maintain and increase political leverage more than
nonviolent campaigns, furthering the claim made by Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) that they
are able to mobilize and draw support from their opponents and build a more expanded
network which weaker actors depend on in order to remain powerful in asymmetric conflicts
(Schock, 2013). He also suggests that among nonviolent campaigns there will be a diversity of
tactics utilized, but the success of each will depend on the specific oppressive conditions
insurgents movements face (Schock, 2013). Furthermore, one study with the specific focus on
violent secessionism showcased that violence does not increase the chance of success when
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type is controlled for, this is because different legal and institutional structures create very
different strategic playing fields (Griffiths & Wasser, 2018). When taking all this into
consideration, this body of research has shown that violence does not increase a movement's
likelihood of success in comparison to other similar movements.
The culmination of all these conclusions in connection with one another showcases that
nonviolence still has a distinct advantage over violent strategies when it comes to creating
increased participation and shifts of loyalty. Nonviolent campaigns are far more likely to gather
more participants and this creates varying levels of commitment and risk tolerance, which
often leads to them utilizing a more diverse range of successful tactics against the oppressive
regime, creating a more comprehensive approach (Howes, 2013). For instance, nonviolent
campaigns can gain support from participants who help from home by participating in strikes or
boycotts or conversely from people who are willing to take more extreme approaches like
putting their lives on the line through direct action campaigns. So while nonviolent campaigns
pull together more people in their ranks which increases their rate of success, violent
campaigns have lower rates of success because they have less public support which leaves
them with less diversified strategies to protest.
Despite the growth of research which suggests that nonviolent movements are more
likely than violent movements to achieve their political goals, there has been a lot of research
which has come out and claimed that this is too strong of a conclusion. Especially when one
considers the fact that all of these studies admit to the fact there are violent movements which
do succeed at achieving their political goals. They instead propose that making a declarative
statement that “nonviolent movements are more successful than violent methods at achieving
political goals” lacks nuance because in reality it is often very difficult to determine what actions
count as a part of social movements and which do not (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). In reality,
protesting groups within a social movement are not a monolith, instead there are usually
multiple protest groups who work independently or at times in collaboration with each other to
achieve their political goals (to end unjust laws, policies, practices, etc) (Kling & Mitchell, 2019).
Many nonviolent movements that are often cited as being successful in research led by
people like Nelson Mandela, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King Jr. always seem to exclude violent
elements that have co-existed alongside them that have helped them achieve successes for the
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overall social movement. Let us take a look at the civil rights movement within the United
States. Although this movement is often cited as a successful nonviolent movement because of
its utilization of peaceful protest, strikes, and boycotts as a strategies for protest, it would be
false to suggest that these were the only strategies that led to this movements success at
achieving political goals (political goals being civil rights). One has to take account of protests
which created an alternative for Black Americans who did not agree with messages of
nonviolent resistance like Malcom X, the Black Panthers, and the work of the Student
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (Kling & Mitchell, 2019).
Additionally, there was also a long history of Black southerners who engaged in armed
self-defense and who had armed confrontations with white supremacists during the Civil
Rights Movement (Kling & Mitchell, 2019). The work of both the violent and nonviolent factions
of this social movement led to the eventual acquisition of civil rights legislation. Therefore,
much of the previous research covered in this paper which claimed that nonviolent
movements are successful fails to show the complicated historical record of social protest. It
would be more valuable to conclude that violent protest should not be ruled as ineffective and
instead research the pros and cons of violent protest based on pragmatic context-dependent
questions.
Others have also criticized that although some researchers may suggest that nonviolent
campaigns are more effective, they are not accessible or even a viable strategy for certain
opposition groups. Wendy Pearlman (2011) added a nuanced and fresh take to this perspective
through her research. Pearlman (2011) suggested that there is an organic relationship between
the degree of internal cohesion within insurgents movements and the likelihood and ability for
them to even consider and use nonviolence instead of violence. She utilized her analysis of the
Palestinian national movement to create the theoretical framework the “organizational
mediation theory of protest.” This theory indicates that movements down exist solely in one
point history, but rather that movements are cycles of resistance that often utilize both violent
and non-violent methods (Pearlman, 2011). This framing of movements as cycles therefore
means that no movement can be characterized as either solely violent or nonviolent in nature.
Therefore, even if data suggests that nonviolence is overall more effective, insurgent
movements will have to make decisions about what strategies they will use depending on how
limited or expansive their choices are and sometimes violent strategies are the only viable
option (Pearlman, 2011).
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Furthermore, newer research has also suggested that even if rebel and insurgent
movements' success is unlikely to defeat state actors and achieve all political goals
comprehensively it is still valuable for politically deprived groups to utilize violent political
protest against stronger state actors (Koos, 2014). Carlo Koos (2014) was able to showcase
that in the case of ethnic rebellion, qualitative evidence has demonstrated that the processs
chain of ethnic discrimination, state repression, violent rebellion, and civil war leads to political
rights (p.21-22). The struggle of the Ijaw ethnic minority group in Nigeria is an example of this,
through their use of a violent campaign the Ijaw minority was able to drop Nigerian oil output
drop by 30 percent (reducing environment damages due to oil was one of their political goals),
they overcame their deprivation, and they saw one of their representatives be appointed as
vice president (Koos, 2014). There are several other cases that showcase this trend, for
instance the violent insurgent movements in South Sudan, the Tuareg rebellion movement in
Niger, and the violent uprisings of Mande and Voltaice in Côte d'ivoire (Koos, 2014). In short,
this new body of literature reframes prior research and showcases that violent protests are still
an effective option for obtaining political rights and they help end discriminatory practices
aimed at disadvantaged groups, particularly because oppressed groups have limited options to
counter oppression.
Research Questions
Despite there being extensive research on whether political violence is a more effective
strategy for groups within social movements to attain political goals than nonviolent strategies,
there are still many gaps within the existing literature. Utilizing the knowledge of existing
literature described above, this paper will now explain some of the existing gaps in the literature
and list several research questions that can be addressed in future research. Here are several
possible research questions:
1. How does the degree and nature of mass mobilization over time affect the degree
of unity in nonviolent campaigns versus campaigns which utilize political violence?
In the Chenoweth and Stephan (2008) study mentioned earlier, which focused on why
nonviolent strategies are more successful than violent strategies, one of the main arguments as
to why they were more successful rested on the fact that they were more effective in creating
larger mass mobilization movements (p. 40-44). Despite them making this claim there is still a
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lack of research on the specific conditions necessary to create a successful mass mobilization
movement for resistance campaigns (nonviolent and violent). Therefore, this research question
will be particularly useful for understanding how successful nonviolent opposition movements
are able to create larger mass mobilization movements based on the unique conditions they
face within their social movement. To examine this phenomena there needs to be more
research conducted that will measure levels of broad based resistance in nonviolent campaigns
and violent campaigns. Additionally, it would be beneficial to measure how geographical region,
ideologies, political culture, and demographics can all affect a nonviolent and violent
movement's ability to mass mobilize and create stronger internal unity.
2. Has political violence in social movements historically helped nonviolent
movements attain political goals (even without the intentional collaboration
between the two groups)?
The Griffiths and Wasser (2018) research article examined above pointed out that in
most of the literature that has concluded that nonviolent resistance strategies are more effective
in achieving political goals than those that utilize political violence, they fail to recognize the
contributions of violent political campaigns to their successes (p. 1328-1329). This research
article mostly focused on the Civil Rights Movement within the United States to showcase that
the efforts of nonviolent and violent resistance groups have worked, without in many cases with
intention, jointly to acquire political goals within a social movement (Griffiths & Wasser, 2018). In
addition, Wendy Pearlman (2011) suggested in her research that no social movement is solely
nonviolent or violent, instead movements operate in cycles and therefore that is why both
groups unintentionally are able to achieve their shared political goals. I believe that this
foundation of research provides an opportunity for future researchers to deconstruct prior claims
that nonviolent or violent campaigns are effective because of their individual strategies. Instead,
future research can focus on depicting how nonviolent and violent campaigns within social
movements work in tandem with one another to achieve political goals, even if it is done
unintentionally.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the campaign and protest strategies that social movement
groups utilize across the world in order to assess whether nonviolent or violent strategies are
more effective at achieving a group’s political goals. Based on my research, I could try to make
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the claim that non-violent strategies are overall more effective. I could suggest this because they
have higher rates of increased participation and shifts of loyalty, they are far more likely to
gather more participants, they have higher levels of commitment and risk tolerance, and they
are capable of utilizing a more diverse range of successful tactics against oppressive regimes
(Howes, 2013).
However, by assessing the literature which currently exists I have concluded that neither
strategy is more effective than the other on the broader level for two reasons. First, because the
assessment of effectiveness should be context based and one strategy will never be universally
more effective than the other. Even if nonviolent strategies have higher rates of success, they
are still not a viable option for all social movements groups. There will always be a need for
some politically deprived groups to utilize violent political protest against oppressive actors
(Koos, 2014; Pearlman, 2011). Therefore, in practice it would be much more useful to
practitioners, protestors, organizers, and social movement groups if researchers assessed
which strategy is more effective in specific contexts (ex. specific social movements, regions,
political regimes, economies, cultures, etc.).
Second, the research question of this paper and the literature that has come before it is
inherently flawed. Much of the literature which had previously researched this question had
failed to understand the cyclical nature of social movements and progress (Pearlman, 2011).
Therefore, the literature had failed to ground its research in the understanding that political
goals are achieved in social movements because of the use of both violent and non-violent
strategies, even when the groups using these strategies were not working in collaboration with
one another. It would be a lot more useful to research how the use of both violent and
nonviolent strategies have been utilized to achieve political goals in social movements, even if
the collaborative effort was unintentional. Then researchers could have a better understanding
of when social movement groups should

use violent or nonviolent strategies and in what

context either is more effective at achieving their political goals.
I believe that in order to accurately continue to explore which methods are more
effective, it would be necessary to build a comparative body of research that showcases in a
nuanced manner how political violence has in many cases been an underlying factor as to why
non-violent campaigns are able to achieve political goals. Even if nonviolent campaigns refuse
to publicly ally or support violent campaigns, they still benefit from the pressure they put on
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oppressive regimes. This would require future researchers to utilize a fine-grained and
context-based research approach in order to gain a more systematic understanding of how
nonviolent and violent strategies work in tandem with one another in social movements to attain
political goals.
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Abstract
This paper compares two cities from Latin America—Medellín, Colombia and San
Salvador, El Salvador—in an effort to show how integrative social urbanist policies lessened
violence and inequality, while less holistic approaches failed to have the desired results. I
analyzed the policies that each city used to address violence and inequality, with an additional
focus on the transportation system. I found that the physical upgrading of Medellín neighborhoods
and investment in transportation led to reductions in violence and inequality, while the Mano Dura
policies of San Salvador did little to reduce homicide rates and combat exclusion. My findings
indicate that to combat urban violence, a cohesive policy is needed that focuses on improving
access and combating the underlying factors of violence, while accounting for the various needs
of the community.
Introduction
Latin America is a rapidly urbanizing region, with 80% of the population living in urban
areas as of 2013 (Yañez‑ Pagans et al. 2019, 4). Although cities can connect individuals to jobs
and opportunities they might not otherwise have access to, Latin America has “the highest levels
of inequality worldwide,” leading to poverty and social exclusion (Strocka 2006, 158). Often,
urbanization creates a pattern of “segmentation and fragmentation,” with lower-income areas
forced to deal with sub-par amenities and less access to transportation (Glebbeek and Koonings
2015, 5). Where urban growth occurs, violence and crime also tend to increase, with an InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights report establishing a “direct correlation between crime
and urban growth” as seen through rising homicide rates (Center for Latin American [CLALS]
2017, 4). However, some cities have managed to battle inequality and violence through
collaborative policies which focused on overcoming legacies of exclusion through neighborhood
investment and expanded transportation access.
The city of Medellín, Colombia has often been touted as one of the most successful
examples for lowering homicide rates through such methods, shedding their title of “most violent
city” in the 1990s for the “most innovative” in 2012 (Dolan 2018, 106). Other cities have taken a
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different approach, focusing on repressive tactics to resolve issues of violence without addressing
underlying causes. This paper will compare two cities from Latin America—Medellín, Colombia
and San Salvador, El Salvador—in an effort to show how integrative social urbanist policies
lessened violence and inequality, while less holistic approaches have failed to achieve the desired
results.
Methodology
I will use a comparative case study (n=2) to determine how the cities differ in their
approach and what the resulting outcome of their methods were. As the purpose of this paper is
to investigate which policies had a greater effect on decreasing inequality and violence, I selected
the cities of Medellín and San Salvador. Both of these cases had high homicides rates per capita
at some point in the last two decades, with both rising to the top five most violent cities in the
world during this period (Sotomayor 2017, 77; Cruz 2019, 555). I will primarily analyze the policies
that each city used to address violence and inequality, with an additional focus on the
transportation system. The inclusion of transit is important in the context of social exclusion, as
exclusion can be mobility-based, wherein individuals have “limited accessibility to opportunities''
(Cordoba, Stanley, and Stanley 2014, 2). As the Medellín government focused on a holistic
approach to combating inequality and poverty, it is impossible to divorce the policy itself from the
effects of transportation. To be fair to both cases, the public transit system in San Salvador is
also included. Social exclusion is when individuals face significant barriers to employment,
education, and opportunities, with extreme exclusion precluding “any prospects of achieving
wellbeing” (CLALS 2017, 6).
When individuals find themselves cut off from the ability to improve their livelihoods, they
can sometimes turn to violence. As a result, there is a strong correlation between exclusion and
violence, as cut-off households turn to criminal activities to earn money and create a sense of
community (CLALS 2017, 6). The conception of social exclusion has been found to be “a more
powerful indicator of violence than poverty or inequality alone,” so this paper is studying both
violence and inequality in an effort to fill in missing data in relation to socioeconomic data for the
cases (CLALS 2017, 3). There are different forms of violence; apart from direct violence, there
is also indirect structural violence, which is caused by “forces such as poverty, marginalization,
and exploitation” (Dolan 2018, 109). Direct violence—the most easily quantifiable measure—will
be primarily defined as X homicides per 100,000 people, as was used in multiple studies (Cerda
et al. 2012; Canavire-Bacarreza, Duque, and Urrego 2016). Because of the difficulty of
measuring indirect violence, socioeconomic data and reductions in inequality will be used where
possible. Exclusion can also be fear-based, defined in relation to transportation as some
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members of society being “fearful of certain public spaces or transport facilities''; this is
especially key in the case of San Salvador for understanding how exclusion works in relation to
transportation (Qamhaieh and Chakravarty 2017, 466).
Medellín
The city of Medellín is the capital of the Department of Antioquia and the second largest
city in Colombia, with a population of approximately 2.34 million people as of 2015 (Ferrari et al.
2018, 354; Sotomayor 2015, 378). Beginning in 1984, Medellín witnessed a wave of violence as
the result of conflicts between paramilitary groups (notably under the Autodefensas Unidas de
Colombia [AUC]), leftist guerillas, drug cartels, and, at times, the military (Dolan 2018, 111-114;
Ferrari et al. 2018, 358). The fighting caused the homicide rate to skyrocket, climbing to 433
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 1991, with Medellín becoming “the most violent city in the
world” (Sotomayor 2017, 77). Operación Orión (Operation Orion), launched in 2002, was an
intense military takeover of some of the more violent areas; the peace negotiations between 2003
and 2004 led to the demobilization of the paramilitary groups (Sotomayor 2017, 81). Before the
intervention of social urbanist policies in 2002, the murder rate was still 185 homicides per
100,000 inhabitants, accounting for 28% of deaths in the city (Cerda et al. 2012, 1045). In
addition, Medellín has been called “the most unequal city in one of the most unequal countries in
Latin America,” with the top 10% of the city earning 50.7 times the income of the poorest 10% of
inhabitants (Dolan 2018, 114). It is therefore of little surprise that the new social urbanist policies
begun by Mayor Sergio Fajardo Valerrama in 2004 were referred to as addressing “an
accumulated historical debt that needed to be remedied” in the poorest and most violent areas of
Medellín (Arteaga 2020, 84).
Social urbanism is the investment in historically underfunded and spatially fragmented
neighborhoods with the aim to “reduce locational disadvantages through comprehensive
neighborhood upgrading” (Sotomayor 2017, 81). In Medellín, the policy is operationalized
through the use of Proyectos Urbanos Integrales (Integral Urban Projects, hereafter referred to
as PUIs), which “incorporate physical, social and institutional aspects” in an effort to improve
specific areas of the city, with a concentration on marginalized areas (Arteaga 2020, 84). Using
a multidimensional method, the PUIs focused on upgrading infrastructure, providing social and
educational facilities, and creating a sense of community and local identity within the targeted
neighborhoods (Brown-Luthango and Reyes 2018, 301). The focus on increasing human
capital, improving educational outcomes, and providing alternatives to gang recruitment were
seen as “central to reducing…much of the violence” which plagued the lower-income areas
(Dolan 2018, 123).
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One of the more noticeable aspects of the new policy was the use of “flashy architectural
statements…to challenge old stigmas associated with violence” in the neighborhoods—the Spain
Library Park, winner of the 2012 Ibero-American Architecture award, is perhaps the most wellknown example (Sotomayor 2015, 374). Notably, instead of simply redesigning the communities
to fit a standard design, the Medellín government took a more collaborative approach to upgrading
the neighborhoods, with community input playing a key role in the renovations. By approaching
the different projects on a “case-by-case basis,” the planning department was able to “[adapt] its
interventions to the requirements of each neighborhood,” allowing for greater flexibility in
addressing the varying concerns of residents (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 124). Between 2004 and
2011, Comuna 13 alone received an estimated 376 million USD in services and programs
(Sotomayor 2017, 82). As of 2015, two PUIs had been finished and three others were in varying
stages of completion (Sotomayor 2015, 386).
Another integral part of the PUIs was a focus on overcoming spatial exclusion resulting
from the neighborhoods’ locations on steep slopes on the outskirts of the city. Medellín’s primary
form of mass transit is the metro system, first established in 1995, that serves as the backbone
of transportation for the city (Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49). It is additionally served by a system of
buses and a bus rapid transit (BRT) system known as Metroplús, the latter of which was awarded
the esteemed gold rating for BRT standards by the Institute for Transportation and Development
Policy (Center for Transatlantic Relations 2017, 112). Currently, two companies, backed by the
city government, have managed to reorganize the “poorly organized bus system” by centralizing
fares and paying drivers on a per-kilometer basis, thus offering services 24/7 and
avoiding unproductive competition (Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49; Ardila 2008, 13). The downtown
area is excluded from their monopoly, but this does show the government’s interest in creating
a cohesive, streamlined transit system.
At the outset of renovations, the “lack of adequate connections with the metro
system…produced important spatial inequalities” in the poorer neighborhoods, as they were less
able to access high-employment centers in the city (Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49). To overcome the
barriers of steep slopes, Medellín implemented the first cable car-based transit system in 2004,
allowing access to the metro in 10 minutes and to the city center in an additional 20 which
connected “one of the poorest and most violent zones of the city to the rest of the urban fabric”
(Bocarejo et al. 2014, 49). Although the cable cars are not technically a mass transit system
because they cannot transport more than 3,000 passengers per hour, they were an ingenious
way to supplement the existing transportation network and combat social exclusion (Bocarejo et
al. 2014, 49). With a variety of transit modes, including bikes, BRT, metro, and the new cable
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cars, Medellín “has been widely used as a benchmark for its transit development,” especially in
relation to its planning in marginalized areas (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 121; Hidalgo and
Huizenga 2013, 73).
The results of the social urbanist policies have garnered a list of more than forty awards
for Medellín, including the 2013 Harvard Design Award and the title of “most innovative city” in
2012 from the Urban Land Institute (Sotomayor 2015, 374). It is difficult to disentangle the results
of the physical upgrading from those of the implementation of new transit connections, so the
majority of studies into the outcomes of the social urbanist policies consider them both together
(Milan and Creutzig 2017, 123; Brand and Dávila 2011, 654; Cerda et al. 2012, 1051). Apart from
reducing travel times from 2.5 hours to seven minutes, the cable cars had an impact on reducing
violence and inequality in the target areas (Canavire-Bacarreza, Duque, and Urrego 2016, 2).
Cerda et al. (2012) compared areas that had been subject to social urbanist interventions and
areas that had not to determine if violence declined. They discovered that the homicide rate
declined by 84% in the treated areas and only 60% in the control neighborhoods; the drop in
“violent events” was 74% higher than in the control group (1047-1051). Their studies were
supported by Canavire-Bacarreza et al. (2016), who focused more closely on the cable car
stations and their effects, discovering that homicide rates declined by 61.8% the year after the
Metrocable was opened in 2004 (19). The effects spilled over into nearby territories, with crime
reduced by 49% more than the control in the target area and 43% in the nearby areas (CanavireBacarreza, Duque, and Urrego 2016, 27).
Other notable results include the increase in use of transit by women in the target areas,
indicating a “great success…for low- and middle-income women” as they are better able to access
opportunities using transportation (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 127). Access by the lower-income
strata as a whole also increased, indicating that social urbanist policies, with their main focus
being to improve the access of poor areas, had “been a success where [they] had been
implemented” (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 128). The results of these studies show that policy
focused on addressing underlying issues of social exclusion and marginalization, coupled with
flexibility and an integrated approach, can reduce violence in outlying areas and the city as a
whole. Furthermore, the improvements helped residents overcome hurdles to improving their
quality of life, with the provision of educational and cultural facilities and transportation allowing
them greater access to opportunities they might otherwise be unable to access. Improving
equality gives them alternatives to criminal activities that they can harness to increase their own
wellbeing.
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San Salvador
San Salvador is the capital of El Salvador, with a population of roughly 1.8 million people
in 2017 (Son, C. R. Chen, and C. F. Chen 2020, 2). The country suffered a civil war from 1980 to
1992, where killings occurred at “the astonishing rate of a thousand per month” as the sides
battled for control (Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2018, 100). After the signing of the peace accords
violence continued, with homicide rates throughout the state climbing to 138.9 homicides per
100,000 individuals. Rates entered a slow decline during the beginning of the 21st century,
reaching 72 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2009 (Richani 2010, 441). A majority of the
violence in El Salvador is the result of gang warfare; the three major gangs operating in the state
are Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), the Eighteenth Street Gang Southerners, and the Eighteenth
Street Gang Revolutionaries (Cruz 2019, 547).
In 2012 a national ceasefire was calledbut the peace did not last, despite the murder rates
declining by over 40% in its aftermath. In 2013 the fragile truce began to fall apart, and by 2015,
El Salvador “had the highest homicide rate in the western hemisphere,” with 104 murders per
100,000 inhabitants (Cruz 2019, 555). Although the preceding numbers are for El Salvador
and not San Salvador specifically, by 2008 “most of the homicides were committed in the
metropolitan area of San Salvador” and other urban areas, allowing for some extrapolation
(Richani 2010, 433). Between 2000 and 2010, the majority of urban growth in San Salvador had
occurred on the extreme outskirts of the city, with some slopes measuring over 30 degrees
(World Bank 2012, 14). The “problem of protracted social exclusion” is often cited as one of the
main causes of the unceasing violence, with the gangs writing in their 2012 truce statement that
“violence was…a result of the complex problems of social exclusion, lack of opportunities, and
institutional repression” (Van der Borgh 2010, 10; Cruz 2019, 553).
In an effort to combat the tide of gang violence, the Salvadoran government turned to
Mano Dura (Iron Fist) policies that centered around repression and zero tolerance. It began in
2003, with a further iteration—known as Super Mano Dura (Super Firm Hand)—being
implemented in 2004 under President Antonio Saca. Under these policies, “thousands of young
people...[were] detained” as the government attempted to curb the size and influence of youth
gangs by imprisoning potential members or placing them in “rehabilitation centers” (Hume 2007,
745; Strocka 2006, 141). Children as young as twelve were arrested for displaying gang-related
tattoos or signs in public, with the law allowing for up to five years of imprisonment. Between 2003
and 2004 approximately 20,000 individuals were arrested, although 95% were released without
charge and the law was eventually ruled unconstitutional (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers
2009, 382).
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There have been alternative initiatives throughout the years that take a softer approach
to the prevailing issue of youth violence. Two, known as Mano Amiga (Friendly Hand) and Mano
Extendida (Extended Hand), focused on a preventative logic, with such interventions as “targeted
education and public health initiatives focusing on ‘at-risk’ youth” and voluntary weapons
collection (Jütersonke, Muggah, and Rodgers 2009, 385). An external approach, called the
Municipal Citizen Security Plans, was undertaken by the United Nations Development
Programme in an effort to promote social capital and community cohesion (Sáinz, Duarte, and
Schaulsohn 2019, 144). Unfortunately, the ending of the truce threatened the stability of the policy
and the preventative plans have “been completely superseded by the repressive component” of
national policy (Sáinz, Duarte, and Schaulsohn 2019, 146).
The insecurity of public transit and the extortion of bus drivers also influences social
exclusion by preventing residents from safely accessing areas of opportunity (Qamhaieh and
Chakravarty 2017, 466). The transportation system of San Salvador is made up entirely of buses,
which are owned by private companies and receive authorization from the Vice-Ministry of
Transport to provide services on specific routes, with a maximum charge of 25 cents (Natarajan
et al. 2015, 1). As of 2005, buses were between 25-40% over capacity and moved more than 1.8
million passengers per day; the fleet had 5,467 buses, with an average of 329 passengers per
day per bus (Ardila 2008, 10). A key difference from Medellín is that the bus owners pay a monthly
rent to operate on their routes, causing the companies to “maximize profits by maximizing the
number of routes and the number of buses affiliated” with them and leading to an oversupply of
buses on the streets (Ardila 2008, 8). The extortion of bus drivers is a common feature in San
Salvador, and 692 transportation workers were killed in El Salvador between 2011 and 2016
(Martínez et al. 2016). This, combined with the fact that between 2008 and 2013 3.3% of all
homicides occurred within a public transit vehicle, understandably leads to an aura of fear around
public transportation, which in turn feeds into fear-based social exclusion (Natarajan et al. 2015,
1).
In addition, buses frequently make unauthorized stops at “unmarked and often dangerous
locations” and skip mandatory stops, further disrupting the passengers’ journey (Natarajan et al.
2015, 4). A six-kilometer BRT system was proposed to modernize the transit system, but “the
absence of a strategic plan” and the scale of the project were not enough to spark a structural
change; the 2015 Supreme Court ruling allowing the use of the segregated transit lanes by other
modes of travel was the final nail in the coffin (Flores and Díaz 2019, 7). Natarajan et al.’s (2015)
findings on the high levels of crime and chaos on San Salvador’s bus system indicate that part of
the problem is “poverty, discrimination, and corruption” and that although the bus system itself
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might be unable to make massive structural change, the use of environmental design and
situational prevention could “powerfully influence the situational factors that promote crime” (2).
It is important to note that the transportation system is currently designed in a silo format, with a
distinct lack of integration between the modes, which was a significant reason for why the BRT
failed and why buses must compete for money, leading to overcrowding. The focus on repressive
policies has been explained as the inability of the state to “deal with the ongoing problem of social
violence and protracted social exclusion,” with the preference being on repressing criminal actors
instead of preventing the crimes themselves (Van der Borgh 2010, 13). Mano Dura and its
subsequent

iterations

were

deemed

“not

just

highly

ineffective…but

essentially

counterproductive,” as gangs recruited more members from the crowded prisons and reorganized
their structures to be more effective (Schuberth 2016, 5). When softer policies were introduced,
they were often underfunded and “lacked serious commitment from the government,” while the
preferred hardline policies acted to the detriment of long-term prevention and rehabilitation
policies (5). Even the truce was a short-term measure, with no “consistent and sustainable plan
to address structural causes of violence” materializing, despite mounting evidence that
addressing social exclusion and the underlying factors of poverty were key (Roque 2017, 502).
The lack of community involvement and the conceptualization of violence as a distinct
phenomenon, divorced from surrounding contexts, resulted in the failure of Mano Dura policies
to drastically reduce homicide rates in San Salvador and to help integrate the poorer communities
into the urban fabric. Youths who were vulnerable to gangs were not provided with alternative
options to crime, hindering their ability to access opportunities that they could use to gain valuable
skills and improve their chances of success in the urban economy. In addition to the policies, the
transportation system was not leveraged to help address longstanding inequalities and aid the
residents in overcoming the barrier of spatial exclusion, especially on the steeper outskirts of the
city. Riders often cite worries over lack of security at bus stops and in the buses, where the
majority of crimes were said to occur (Natarajan et al. 2015, 7). The dangerous atmosphere
surrounding public transportation contributes to fear-based exclusion and, as buses are the only
means of public transit in San Salvador, causes worried individuals to be less able to access
employment, further contributing to inequality and lowered incomes that are detrimental to quality
of life.
Comparison
Violence is built into systems that “perpetuate a lack of access to resources and unequal
chances in life,” so a holistic approach is necessary for addressing the prevalence of homicides
and crime in cities (Dolan 2018, 109). As gangs form alongside a “rise in injustice, inequality, and
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social exclusion,” it is necessary to tackle these underlying causes instead of simply repressing
the violence in the hopes that it will resolve itself (Strocka 2006, 137). Medellín’s approach was
able to reduce levels of violence in the targeted areas because they took an integrated approach
to combating inequality, upgrading the infrastructure, cultural facilities, and transit access in an
effort to minimize long-standing deficiencies that the community faced. Their flexible approach
was able to “adapt to the changing dynamics of the city,” allowing the government to address the
unique needs of each neighborhood (Sotomayor 2015, 375). In contrast, the Salvadoran
government favored repressive, one-size-fits-all policies that sought to eradicate crime without
addressing underlying concerns; it is therefore unsurprising that they were ineffective and that
homicide rates continued to remain high (Schuberth 2016, 5). To prevent the extortion practices
of the gangs “alternative sources of income were crucial,” but the socioeconomic projects that
they had hoped for as part of the truce failed to materialize due to a lack of funding and interest
on the part of the government (Van der Borgh 2019, 15).
In addition, the struggles to reform the transit system perpetuated social exclusion and
violence. The cash-based fare system contained “too much opportunity for corruption and theft,”
and the lack of investment in lighting and security for bus stops escalated crime (Natarajan et al.
2015, 9). Even the BRT, which improved the quality of life for nearby residents in Medellín as part
of the integrated system, failed to materialize due to the patchwork nature in which it was
implemented (Gómez and Semeshenko 2018, 122). Without working on improving social
inclusion and equality with the participation of the community in which the policies are being
implemented, it will be much harder to successfully lower homicide rates in urban areas. Medellín
provided opportunities in the target neighborhoods to aid residents in increasing their skillset and
accompanied the approach with transportation, allowing greater access to jobs outside of the
neighborhood that the residents might not otherwise be able to reach. San Salvador limited
opportunities for growth and underfunded the few initiatives that provided alternatives for youths,
forcing them to turn to gangs to provide income.
Limitations
There are some limitations to the research and results of this paper. I did not attempt to
analyze the potential influences that gangs have to suppress violence and their involvement in
managing violence within their territories, because the purpose was to analyze government
policies. Unfortunately, there have been few studies into the socioeconomic effects of
transportation in Latin America and fewer specifically focusing on violence; the majority focus on
North America, which has different transit and land use approaches that make extrapolation
difficult (Milan and Creutzig 2017, 123; Yañez‑ Pagans et al. 2019, 1). In addition, socioeconomic
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data and homicide rates for San Salvador were difficult to find and verify, resulting in the use of
El Salvador’s homicide rate as a proxy measure. It is highly possible that the inability to find solid
data and research on the chosen topic was the result of linguistic barriers. The use of a translator
was obtained for one promising article, but she had limited time and the majority of articles that I
discovered were beyond my own abilities. In the case of Medellín, there is the possibility of
confounding variables as “precise measurement of the social and economic consequences of the
Metrocables is difficult” because of the interconnectedness of transportation and the
neighborhood redevelopment, resulting in measuring them together (Brand and Dávila 2011,
654). There has also been a recent decline in homicide rates in San Salvador, falling from 108.5
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2015 to 35.3 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants in 2019.
Although the government has argued that this is because of their policies, there is some evidence
that it is because of an agreement between MS-13 and Barrio 18, who can reduce the homicide
rates at will (Navarrete and Austin 2020).
Conclusion
Although the “social capital approach is probably the most promising” method to handle
gangs and violence, it is the “least frequently adopted” policy in Latin America (Strocka 2006,
142). Social exclusion and the inability of individuals to access opportunities to improve their lives
is a strong contributor to violence and investing in social capital is a key method of improving
communities where it is prevalent (Ardila 2008, 6). In order to overcome this hurdle for residents,
substantial investment into historically underserved areas is necessary to connect residents to
the city and provide them with alternatives to gangs and criminal activities. This paper has shown
how Medellín’s integrated policy approach was able to reduce violence and inequality, moving
Medellín from the most violent city to the most innovative city in the span of two decades. San
Salvador, which also suffers from high homicide rates, failed to implement a collaborative
approach and instead focused on repression to deal with the gang violence dominating the state.
As a result, the city’s homicide rates remained high and their public transportation system was
not adequate for aiding lower-income residents in overcoming social exclusion. San Salvador can
learn from Medellín’s policies and implement them in their city to combat extortion and assist their
marginalized neighborhoods. The role of the community is key, as one of the reasons for the
failure of the softer policies in El Salvador was the lack of engagement of local actors. Other cities
in Latin America can also benefit from this research, as the rates of urbanization and inequality
in the region are among the highest in the world; by focusing on improving access and combating
the underlying factors of violence, state and local governments will be able to build safer cities
that serve the needs of all residents.
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Dimensions of Power: Women’s Liberation in China and Japan
Naomi Miller, Virginia Commonwealth University
Abstract
Both China and Japan have been subject to criticism not only for widespread gender
inequity, but for either state failures to adequately secure the rights of women or active sabotage
of domestic women’s movements. The goal of this paper is not to compare the severity of
inequities, but to examine what movements have arisen to combat them and the ways the state
has used its power to curb their efficacy. The comparison of state strategies will rely on Steven
Lukes’ tripartite model of the dimensions of power: decision-making, non-decision-making, and
ideological. China has leveraged mostly decision-making and non-decision-making power, as in
its overt crackdowns on protestors, formal restrictions on political organizations unaffiliated with
the state, and legislation that criminalizes provoking trouble. The Japanese state, meanwhile,
has relied heavily on non-decision-making and ideological power to win victories in the cultural
sphere that necessarily impact public policy rather than passing legislation that directly bars
women from exercising their rights to speech or petition. The ultimate impact of these strategies
has been a Chinese feminist movement that is more popular but less effective in its pursuit of
altered policy. In Japan, meanwhile, women’s advocacy has been broadly co-opted, and the
Japanese state has provided concessions that maintain the status quo while failing to address
the root of gender inequality in the nation.
Introduction
Both China and Japan have been subject to criticism not only for widespread gender
inequity but for either state failures to adequately secure the rights of women or active sabotage
of domestic women’s movements. The goal of this paper is not to compare the severity of
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inequities, but to examine what movements have arisen to combat them and the ways the state
has used its power to curb their efficacy. The comparison of state strategies will rely on Steven
Lukes’ tripartite model of the dimensions of power: decision-making, non-decision-making, and
ideological.1
While not a formally single-party state, Japan has been described as a “One-and-a-Half
Party State” due to the practical control one party wields over the function of government. The
power of the LDP is nowhere enshrined in law, but due to the clientelist ties between the LDP
and the Japanese bureaucracy, the private sector, and the variety of smaller parties that often
join its coalitions, the LDP have become the head of a “one-party state” in practice, losing
control of the government only twice since 1955.2 In this respect, the Japanese state bears
similarities to China, where the Communist Party of China (CPC) has remained the nation’s sole
governing party since the founding of the current government in 1949. Both the LDP and the
CPC have effectively cemented their control over domestic politics, allocating position and
influence based on systems of patronage. Not only do these parties wield formal control over
legislative and executive processes, but they also exercise additional informal power by setting
agendas, constraining the bounds of discourse, and popularizing rhetoric that preempts conflicts
or keeps them in a state of latency.

The repercussions of these political norms are

comprehensive but have particular ramifications for women’s liberation movements in either
nation.
Despite Japan’s position as a “developed nation” per the World Bank/IDF and China’s
status as the second-largest economy in the world, neither nation scores well in assessments of
gender equity compared to similarly wealthy countries. In the United Nations Development
Programme’s (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index (GII), Japan ranks 47th in female political
representation and 45th in labor force participation.3 45.4% of Japanese women hold the
equivalent of a bachelor’s degree, but compose only 18.2% of the Japanese labor force and
only 6.4% of the managerial class. Only 58.7% of Chinese women had completed secondary

1

Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View, 2nd ed. (New York, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
Ethan Scheiner, Democracy without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007). Junnosuke Masumi, 現代政治 : 1955年以後 / Current Politics: 1955
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education, compared to 71.9% of men. As of 2019, China was ranked 39th globally in the GII,
while Japan came in 24th. In both nations, rates of domestic abuse exceed 25%.4 While
implicitly illegal since the 1980s, the first piece of Chinese legislation to name domestic abuse
and provide recourse for battered women was not introduced until 2001 with an amendment to
China’s Second Marriage Law. In Japan, domestic violence is still governed by civil codes rather
than criminal law. Victims have limited avenues to pursue redress, and offenders face neither
criminal charges nor mandatory rehabilitation. Domestic women’s liberation movements have
attempted to address gendered inequalities in their respective nations, but in doing so, they
have faced indifference or hostility from their governments.
China has leveraged decision-making and non-decision-making power, as in its overt
crackdowns on protests, formal restrictions on political organizations unaffiliated with the state,
and legislation that criminalizes “provoking trouble.”5 The Japanese state, meanwhile, has relied
heavily on non-decision-making and ideological power to win victories in the cultural sphere that
necessarily impacts public policy rather than passing legislation that directly bars women from
exercising their rights to speech or petition.6 The ultimate impact of these strategies has been a
Chinese feminist movement that is more popular but less effective in its pursuit of altered policy.
In Japan, meanwhile, women’s advocacy has been broadly co-opted and the Japanese state
has provided concessions that maintain the status quo while failing to address the root of
gender inequality in the nation.7
Decision-Making Power
The definition of power Lukes proposes is the ability of one party to act in their own
interests against those of another party, and decision-making power serves as its most easily
identifiable facet due to its visibility.8 Lukes argues one-dimensional perceptions of power focus
solely on “the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable conflict of
4
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(subjective) interests,” and that securing interests through observable conflict is only one of
multiple avenues to exercise power.9 Nonetheless, Lukes incorporates this power decision-making power - into his three-faced model, arguing not that the decision-making power
does not exist or does not deserve examination, but that it is not the sole expression of
divergent interests in society, and that theoretical frameworks built upon it in exclusion are
incomplete.10 In the context of gender equity in China and Japan, this paper will view
decision-making power as predominant policy preferences and the willingness to enforce them.
Despite the dissimilarities between the situation of women in these nations, the basic
goals of feminist movements in China and Japan are broadly aligned: cracking down on sexual
violence, securing greater representation in government, and curbing gender discrimination in
the school and workplace. The distinction in state action concerning these requests is not
unilaterally negative - both nations have modified sexual harassment law in response to recent
domestic and international scrutiny - but neither rank well internationally in terms of gender
parity, partially as a consequence of policy. In Japan, this manifests as policies that are either
weak or nonexistent. Legal definitions of violence or harassment are limiting, standards of proof
in civil cases are closer to that of American criminal law, and criminal cases often go
unprosecuted, all of which contribute to the prevalence of violence against women.11 Despite
having one of the worst gender gaps of any developed nation per the World Economic Forum,
political representation and public policy have moved sluggishly to combat most issues,
sometimes backsliding altogether.12 This inaction contributes to the extant struggles of women.
It is, however, in contrast to the Chinese response, which is more active and hostile
towards women who highlight the necessity of greater equality. The Chinese state engages in
censorship of rhetoric it considers threatening, and in this respect, agitation against existing
gender and sexual hierarchies is no exception. With the words “Me Too” subject to censorship,
Chinese feminists attempting to share their experiences and discuss gendered violence used
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the homonym “mi tu” (米兔) in order to circumvent censors.13 As more keywords become subject
to monitoring or restriction, however, some women’s rights activists have attempted to transition
to primarily offline organization. While in-person networks are necessarily more difficult for the
state to surveil, physical organizing comes with its own substantial risks.
In 2015, in commemoration of International Women’s Day, a variety of Chinese feminists
in Beijing, Guangzhou, and Hangzhou planned to distribute stickers and informational material
on gender equity and sexual harassment. Before they even began their demonstration, dozens
were arrested by the Chinese government for “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,”
considered a crime in China since 1997 that bears a maximum sentence of five years.14 Most of
the women were released, but Li Maizi, Wei Tingting, Zheng Churan, Wu Rongrong, and Wang
Man remained imprisoned. The “Gang of Five,” or “Feminist Five,” as they would become known
by the media, were subject to daily interrogations. One of them was denied her hepatitis
medication, while another is alleged to have had a minor heart attack in custody.15 After 37 days
and substantial international outcry, the women were eventually released. By this time, many
members of their organization had retreated into hiding.16 In light of this incident and other
instances of state hostility, some Chinese activists have elected to organize overseas, which
has only contributed to the attempts of the CPC to suppress them. Accusations of “separatism”
and hatred of men have expanded to include the claims that Chinese women’s rights activists
are puppets of foreign powers, acting not to secure their own rights but to sow divisive,
dangerous rhetoric and weaken Chinese social harmony.17
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Non-Decision-Making Power
Non-decision-making power departs from decision-making power in that it describes not
merely an action, but the range of potential actions available. If the power is the capability to act
against the interests of another, then decision-making power describes scenarios in which an
interest, expressed as policy, strengthens one group’s position while damaging that of the other;
non-decision-making power goes further by removing the ability to express an interest politically.
Lukes argues that while the two-dimensional model misses what he sees as the third vital
means of analyzing power, it expands its understanding of conflict from the solely overt to the
covert, allowing for an examination of “potential issues over which there is an observable
conflict” and taking into account the grievances of “those who are partly or wholly excluded from
the political system.”18 Through their predominance in the halls of government, both the
Communist Party of China and the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan are able to excise certain
kinds of discourse from political dialogue entirely, limiting discussions of gender to what they
consider the appropriate purview. In their exercise of non-decision-making power, they bear
marked similarities, even if their uses of decision-making power show variations.
Constraints on dialogue are evident in the kinds of debate on gender equality that these
states are willing to sanction. While both the Chinese and Japanese governments do endorse
feminist activism that they see as reasonable, they allow for debate only when it is compatible
with their other political goals, does not damage the security of the party, and is unthreatening to
what the CPC or LDP consider the “traditional” national understanding of femininity. In China,
this state-sanctioned feminism primarily takes the form of the All-China Women’s Federation
(ACWF). The ACWF was established in 1949 as independent of the CPC, but many of its
founding members were prominent within the Party itself and therefore subject to its influence
and oversight. Over time, these links were cemented, and the ACWF was often utilized by the
CPC as a mobilization tool, achieving Party aims by facilitating a connection with women
specifically.

18
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The present-day ACWF has aimed to work within the acceptable boundaries of public
discourse, which has frequently placed it at a crossroads. While still formally independent of the
CPC, it retains a dual responsibility both to the women of China and to the Chinese state,
serving, in its own words, “as a bridge linking the party and the government with women and as
an important social pillar of the state power.”19 These obligations have often come into conflict,
as was the case during China’s One-Child Policy. The ACWF’s response highlighted the
disproportionate burdens borne by Chinese women in family planning but characterized the
issues of female infanticide and coerced sterilization as a matter of socialist modernization
rather than individual rights or the rights of a particular group. The order, the ACWF argued, was
deleterious to “a collective pursuit that supposedly benefits everyone, including both women and
men,” and was therefore objectionable for the damage it did to “national modernization,”
adopting a framing in which “individual and state are organized not in separation and
opposition.”20 When the interests it represents come into conflict with extant policy, those
interests must be made compatible, altering the focus of discourse and constraining it to a
particular set of arguments that present women’s liberation as necessary to national well-being
rather than the well-being of women as a discrete group with their own goals.21 Rather than
actively pursuing an abolition of the order, the ACWF focused primarily on alternative means of
population control instead of its wholesale abandonment.
In more recent years, as the impacts of the One-Child Policy have led to a dearth of
marriageable women and a declining birth rate, the ACWF has coined the term “leftover women”
to describe women of childbearing age who have yet to find a husband. Of women who are
highly-educated but still single as they near the age of 30, the ACWF said “The tragedy is, they
don’t realize that as women age, they are worth less and less, so by the time they get their M.A.
or Ph. D, they are already old, like yellowed pearls.” It exhorted women - especially “girls with an
average or ugly appearance” - to marry as soon as possible in order to maximize their chances
of securing a husband, advising women to drop their romantic standards and start a family as
soon as the opportunity arose.22 The basic principles of the ACWF are clear, but the ways in
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which they may be expressed have been limited by the organization’s proximity to power.
Regarding reproductive agency, the ACWF’s position has varied based on whether or not it is
able to reconcile its dedication to women’s liberation with the expressed aims of the Chinese
state. In its opposition to the One-Child Policy, the ACWF made this stance compatible with
state aims, and in its condemnation of unmarried women, it has elected not to advocate for a
particular right (to choose to remain unmarried) that has been defined out of the range of
acceptable discourse. A survey of 494 women workers in the Guangdong region found that only
5% identified the ACWF as “the most effective body in resolving their problems at work,” citing
the “pragmatic and gradualist” approach of the ACWF as deleterious to its efficacy.23 These
complaints and others suggest that state-sanctioned organizations like the ACWF are limited in
their responses by the non-decision-making power of the state.
While election to Japan’s Diet is not legally restricted to members of the LDP, the LDP’s
strong, longstanding hold on its parliamentary majority has likewise allowed it to restrict the
purview of debates on gender equity. The internal politics of Japan’s Diet operate on a complex
web of links between bureaucrats, politicians, and influential private citizens based partially on
ideological similarities, but just as frequently on political mentorship. Ascension in the ranks is
typically achieved by tying oneself to a particular mentor or patron, with the implication that
present-day support will lead to future gains in influence.24 Despite maintaining a degree of
ideological diversity through the process of allying with or absorbing smaller parties, the LDP
keeps a hold of the government, and gender discourse in politics has been driven primarily by
its leadership, including former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.
In 2013, as part of an attempt to address some of the criticisms his administration had
faced with regard to their policies on gender, then-PM Shinzo Abe launched a collection of
economic initiatives, nicknamed “Womenomics,” designed to bolster Japan’s aging workforce by
taking greater advantage of working-age women. These policies were designed to encourage
female participation in the Japanese labor force and led to a roughly two-million-person increase
in the number of working women, but failed to address many of the opposition’s concerns about
women and labor. Like its political system, the business system of Japan is reliant on perceived
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loyalty and patronage. Promotion in a firm requires commitment and constant availability, with
the potential and willingness to put in overtime as a prime marker of a promising employee.
44.2% of Japanese working women hold part-time positions with little opportunity for promotion,
and only 6.4% of those in management positions are female.25 Selecting for variations in time
spent at a particular workplace and rates of education, the International Monetary Fund found
that being male increased the chance of a promotion tenfold while being a college graduate
increased it by a factor of only 1.65.26 This verifies many cultural analyses of Japan, as well as
the anecdotal experiences of workplace discrimination reported by many Japanese women,
wherein even highly-educated and qualified employees in exacting fields - medicine, economics,
teaching - are expected to defer to less-experienced male colleagues.27
Female undereducation, the inability to secure reliable childcare while at work,
prioritization of the family, and the tendency of women to pursue lower-paying jobs of their own
volition were all phenomena targeted by Abe’s Womenomics policies, but the idea that
Japanese women might be discriminated against has been broached most loudly by private
citizens. Masahiko Uotani, CEO of popular cosmetics manufacturer Shiseido, called Japan’s 110
ranking on the Gender Gap Index “completely unacceptable,” touting his own company’s quota
of 40% female management as a noble goal other businessmen should strive to meet. Uotani’s
interests, however, align fairly closely with those of women; as the head of a Japanese
cosmetics company, the market to which he must appeal is almost entirely female.28 An
alteration in the political order - concessions for female activists, greater political representation
for women, concrete changes in policy - threatens the establishment and the system of
mentorship it relies upon. Changing the internal structure of Shiseido alone is both easier and
less threatening - if anything, as a move that demonstrates respect for its primary clientele, it
has the potential to breed an increase in sales.
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In keeping with Lukes’ analysis of non decision-making power, there are segments of the
Japanese public who have advocated for comprehensive rather than gradualist reforms, and the
LDP’s success in keeping them from the exercise of decision-making power does not imply they
do not exist. Of the parties that have pushed for greater representation for women in
government and policies more favorable to women’s rights, the Constitutional Democratic Party
of Japan (CDP), current leaders of the opposition, have risen as the most notable. Rather than
approaching low workforce participation as a consequence of undereducation or individual
choice, the CDP platform focuses more heavily on addressing gendered discrimination and
material obstacles to workforce participation as a means to increase the number of Japanese
working women. While the opposition’s stance has provided an alternative to voters, this
alternative is unacceptable to the “political coalitions between conservative policymakers,
politicians, large firms, and core regular workers” that ultimately determine which factions
remain in power.29 The LDP is able to maintain its position by “not offending these key
constituencies,” but in doing so, it has not addressed the inequities Womenomics was designed
to reduce.30 The CDP, meanwhile, has placed itself at odds with the traditional patron-client
system through which power is allocated, preventing it from including its platform as even one of
a range of potential options. In the 2019 Parliamentary election, the LDP fielded 12 female
candidates, of whom 10 gained seats. Despite offering almost double that number, only six
female candidates who were run by the opposition were actually elected.31
Ideological Power
Lukes’ primary revision of previous understandings of power is the addition of a third
facet: the ideological. Prior models of power that incorporated only the decision-making and
non-decision-making facets struggled to identify the differences between the successful
utilization of non-decision-making power and “universal acquiescence in the status quo.”32 The
idea of power upon which these models rely is designed to analyze conflict, but if a conflict is
29
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not

observable,

it

cannot

be

distinguished from an agreement. The inclusion of

non-decision-making power in this framework is designed to take into account the desires of
those who fall outside extant systems, not merely those who act within them. Even within the
dual framework of power, however, Lukes identifies a potential flaw: an agreement that is forced
is difficult to distinguish from one that is genuine if any grievance would be covert regardless.
The challenge Lukes attempts to address in his revisions to single or dual-dimensional
frameworks is in determining the difference between a peace that has been enforced by the
more powerful actor and a peace that is the product of genuine complacency. Lukes concludes
that when left with only two dimensions, the model of power has failed to address “the socially
structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups.”33 Power, Lukes argues, is not an
individual phenomenon, but a group of people acting in concert to secure shared interests. The
third dimension of power, where conflicts go unacknowledged even by the party under the
power of the other, is the ideological. Despite the innate conflict in interest between one group
and another, neither may even be aware it exists. It never enters the political realm not because
it has been expelled by force or defined out of the range of acceptable discourse, but because
normative principles are embraced even by those who are most negatively affected by the
distribution and use of power. Lukes references gender politics explicitly in his analysis, claiming
that while female compliance with orders that do not benefit them is often coerced, it can often
be the consequence of self-policing and the internalization of norms.34 With regard to gender
norms and female political participation, the Chinese state is fighting a headwind it is partially
responsible for. The losses Chinese women’s liberation has faced in concrete policy change and
acceptability of discourse run counter to its success in the realm of popular perception.
The argument that the use of ideological power against women’s liberation movements
has been more successful in Japan than in China seems, on its face, a difficult one to make, as
the Chinese state has historically leveraged coercion and persuasion in conjunction. The
Chinese state’s endorsement of women’s liberation under Mao has, however, led to an
alteration of norms that allow Chinese women greater self-advocacy, even if they must contend
with the struggles of organizing when most common forums are routinely censored or purged.
The ideal basis of comparison between China, a state that regularly utilizes censorship tools to
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counteract feminist organizations, and Japan, where free speech rights are more robust, is the
success of the Me Too movement in China and the failure of its Japanese equivalent.35
Ideological power, when well-exercised, is indistinguishable from voluntary choice, and the
absence of observable conflict in Japan, when compared to China, is a consequence of the use
of ideological power to force conflicts into latency.
The best-known “face” of the Me Too movement in Japan is journalist Shiori Ito. In 2018,
Ito met Noriyuki Yamaguchi, an influential journalist and a friend of Shinzo Abe, for dinner with
the intent of discussing a job opportunity. According to Ito, Yamaguchi drugged her, took her to a
hotel, and assaulted her. After facing pushback from law enforcement, who variously made her
re-enact her assault, told her she did not seem like a victim, and ultimately declined to
prosecute, Ito went public with her claims.36 Due to inconsistencies in Yamaguchi’s story, the
court eventually awarded Ito 3 million yen ($30,000) in a civil suit.37 Rather than replicating the
Me Too movement as it took place in the United States, however, the response was relatively
hushed. When Alyssa Milano accused Harvey Weinstein of rape, 87 subsequent women came
forward with allegations of harassment and assault against him, and hundreds more took to
social media to share stories of painful personal experiences with unrelated assaulters.38 While
other public accusations of assault have taken place in Japan, the scale has not been
comparable to that of similar movements abroad.
Japanese law allows for the conviction of rape only if the victim can provide proof that
physical violence or threats were involved, and this narrow perception of sexual violence is
supported by polling. In a poll conducted by Japan’s public broadcasting network Nippon Hoso
Kyokai (日本放送協会, NHK), 11% of respondents said that if two people agreed to have dinner
alone with one another, consent to sexual activity had been provided implicitly, irrespective of
later accounts. In the same poll, 27% said that having a drink would constitute consent, and

35

Linda Hasunuma and Ki-young Shin, “#MeToo in Japan and South Korea: #WeToo, #WithYou,” Journal of Women,
Politics & Policy 40, no. 1 (March 2, 2019): pp. 97-111, https://doi.org/10.1080/1554477x.2019.1563416.
36
Shaun O'Dwyer, “What Lies behind Shiori Ito's Lonely #Metoo Struggle,” The Japan Times (株式会社ジャパンタイム
ズ/Japan Times Ltd., January 28, 2020),
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/01/26/commentary/japan-commentary/lies-behind-shiori-itos-lonely-metoostruggle/. Shiori Ito, Black Box (S.l., Japan: Tilted Axis Press, 2021).
37
“Shiori Ito: Japanese Journalist Awarded $30,000 in Damages in Rape Case,” BBC News (BBC, December 18,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-50832524.
38
“Harvey Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded,” BBC News (BBC, April 7, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672.

44

Dimensions of Power: Women’s Liberation in China and Japan

35% believed drinking to intoxication would constitute consent, even though the formal ruling in
Ito’s case held that extreme intoxication removes an individual’s ability to provide informed
consent.39 A separate poll by anti-sexual assault advocacy organization WeToo saw 64.4%
responding that kissing qualified as consent to sexual activity.40
Comparatively, in the United States, the Me Too movement that began with the outing of
figures like Harvey Weinstein and Bill Cosby as serial sexual predators relied on an outgrowth of
public support. While the backlash against potential victims was and remains substantial, the
Me Too phenomenon was reliant on a pre-existing willingness to engage in broad dialogue. The
fact that Shiori Ito’s story was perceived differently by the Japanese public than Alyssa Milano’s
was by the United States demonstrates the impact of ideological power. If power is the behavior
of groups to secure their interests, then the widespread consequences of Milano’s accusation
against Weinstein cannot be understood merely as one woman precipitating a sea change, but
as an individual riding an existing wave. The movement that followed Milano’s claim expressed
a collective desire to address sexual violence in general. Yamaguchi’s conviction for the assault
against Ito was touted as a victory for Japanese women’s liberation but is speculated to have
been largely the product of international backlash.41 Ito had been instructed not to come forward
for the good of the nation, but the time she did, it was already too late; to save face
internationally and combat the perception of Japan as hyper-traditional and hostile to women, it
was necessary to convict her abuser. Milano’s victory (and that of the 87 other women) was
symbolic of a broader change in norms that had already taken place, while Ito, by coming
forward, was faced with the impossible task of provoking one.
In contrast, despite crackdowns against feminist organizations and the promotion of
rhetoric that holds Chinese feminists to be man-hating, separatist tools of the West, the Me Too
movement in China has nonetheless gained ground. The Great Firewall system of online
censorship and information restriction often scans for particular keywords, but rather than
posting under a “#MeToo,” campaigners against sexual violence have used the hashtag “#米兔,”
(mi tu), a homonym that translates to “rice rabbit.” The new hashtag served both as a means to
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organize and as a way to demonstrate linguistically that Chinese feminism was, in this respect,
homegrown. The initial catalyst for Me Too within China had been Western, but concerns around
the safety of women were an expression of domestic realities.42
The Chinese state treats most political organizations outside of the Party as a potential
threat, and Chinese feminism is viewed particularly dimly not only as a form of resistance but as
one that already has a substantial historical antecedent within Chinese culture generally and
Chinese communism specifically. Despite the modern-day promotion of neo-Confucianism, the
Marxist-Leninist roots of the present-day state held the feudal order to be an unjust hierarchy
and viewed traditional gender roles as an outgrowth of it. Many elements of Maoism and Maoist
propaganda can be seen as pseudo-feminist, and the thought of contemporaries like his wife,
Jian Qing, are particularly overt in their glorification of the female revolutionary.43 By demanding
adherence to socialism with Chinese characteristics, the state risks its legitimacy by coming into
conflict with women’s liberation activists. As the popular embrace of #米兔 has shown, the
promotion of the state ideology has laid the groundwork for thought that is anti-hierarchical,
even if the hierarchy being opposed is that which has been erected by the state itself. The
primary danger of Chinese feminism to the state lies in its potential popularity, and despite the
efforts to repress it, some of that popularity has already been realized.
This contrast is rendered even more notable by virtue of the fact that many of the
underlying bases for Chinese and Japanese gender norms are shared. Prior to the fourteenth
century and the importation/adoption of Confucian role ethics and gendered expectations,
Japanese society was comparatively egalitarian. Women exercised the right to own property,
marriages were understood to be voluntary and potentially impermanent, and while women
never achieved the kind of political and especially military status held by Japanese men, they
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were nonetheless assumed to hold a spiritual and intellectual potential on par with that of men.
Japan’s medieval transition - described by Keirstead as a “sex change” from the“luxurious, fluid,
feminine era” to the “staunchly masculine” feudal period - aligned it more closely with the
Confucian concepts that had already taken deep root in neighboring China.44
In intervening years, the backlash against feudal ideas under the Mao regime led to the
alteration or abandonment of many of these role structures, while the “ideal of Japan” remains
reliant on the perception of the nation as it existed in the medieval period. Neo-Confucian
concepts in China are an attempt to return to prior conceptions of gender that were explicitly
rejected by its more recent state ideologies, while the concept of Japanese “traditional” gender,
reified during the Meiji Restoration and re-enforced during the Showa period, has been a
constant element of the state ideology for centuries.45 The idea of a China divorced from
Confucian gender norms is one that has been adopted by some of its most visible leaders in the
political and civil realms; the same is not true for Japan, where the popular conception of the
Japanese woman has for centuries diminished her socioeconomic and political power.
Conclusions
China places more formal restrictions on political organization, but the exercise of
decision-making power belies mounting losses in the ideological realm. Between the material
conditions of the Chinese woman, wherein she is outnumbered by men and therefore exercises
more control in when and who she marries, and the political history of the nation, where female
political participation and the subversion of gender hierarchies were once explicit elements of
the state ideology, women’s liberation has made gains in popular support. Japan, in contrast,
has a comparatively weak Me Too movement, fewer extant women’s liberation organizations,
and an opposition that risks its power each time it attempts to push for more comprehensive
gender-equity measures. The use of decision-making power by China has led to greater
visibility for female activists both domestically and internationally but has made organization
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both difficult and dangerous. In Japan, meanwhile, the reliance on ideological power, rather than
overt power or coercion, has sapped popular support for women’s liberation in both the civil and
political realms.
This is not to say that change in either country is an impossibility. Despite the substantial
political obstacles that stand in the way of Chinese gender equality, the growing popularity of
feminist thought and its significance to Chinese political history may eventually make
crackdowns a less practical option than compromise. While this paper attempts to chart the
behaviors of large groups and institutions, a substantial diversity of political thought exists in
Japan, and altered policy remains a possibility - either through the weakening of the clientelism
that makes Japanese politics so change-resistant, or however unlikely, by an internal shift in the
LDP itself.
While the one- and two-dimensional models of power are antecedent to Lukes and his
third dimension, it is the introduction of the ideological angle where Lukes has faced the most
substantial criticism and where he has mounted the most vigorous defense of his central
arguments. In a 1997 response to Power, Colin Hays claims the introduction of ideological
power as a third facet effectively removes the potential of individuals to recognize their
circumstances or attempt to alter them. According to Hays, with the addition of an ideological
element of power, Lukes “resurrects the specter of false consciousness,” and promotes a
“deeply condescending conception of the social subject as an ideological dupe.”46 If Hays’
reading is applied, then while the Chinese woman, aware of her circumstances and eager to
change them, may eventually make progress in the decision-making or non-decision-making
realms, the Japanese woman has no such potential. This is an application of his argument that
Lukes takes pains to refute.
Decision-making power, while efficacious, is unignorable - both those it has been
utilized against and onlookers with no specific interest can recognize and respond to its use.
Non-decision-making power forces conflicts to the margins of political dialogue, but cannot
extinguish them fully. Ideological power, as Lukes describes it, “is always focused on particular
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domains of experience and is never, except in fictional dystopias, more than partially effective.”47
To clarify his position, Lukes returns again to gender politics, noting that women who have
internalized normative attitudes may not press their interests through overt or covert conflict, but
retain their ability to accurately evaluate their position and behave rationally under those
circumstances. Even when the expression of interests has been disincentivized, this does not
preclude the recognition of those interests or plans to pursue them in the future: “One can
consent to power and resent the mode of its exercise.”48 The derailment of women’s liberation in
China or Japan is not indicative of a lack of motivation or capability on the part of the women
affected, but of a lack of power - and even when power is utilized to substantial effect, its
balance has always been shifted by time.
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Review of The Collision of Political

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v.

and Legal Time: Foreign Affairs

Sawyer (1952), before moving to the cases

and the Supreme Court’s

of Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981) and
Regan v. Wald (1984), and finishing with the

Transformation of Executive

detainee

Authority by Kimberley L. Fletcher

cases

during

the

Bush

administration and a strong conclusion on
“constitutional change instigated outside the
legalized constitution” (p. 179). She explains

Emily Downs, Virginia

the cases’ roles in changing or shaping the

Commonwealth University

executive’s role in foreign and domestic
affairs, the historical, political, and legal

In political science scholar Kimberley

context of each ruling, and the logic and

L. Fletcher’s study The Collision of Political

mindset of each justice involved in each

and Legal Time: Foreign Affairs and the
Supreme

Court’s

Transformation

decision. Fletcher frequently reiterates the

of

importance of the Supreme Court’s role and

Executive Authority the law and American

the profound impact it has had on the roles

Political Development (APD) to “reexamine

of the branches of government. In doing so,

foreign affairs cases to illustrate how the

she makes a compelling case for the Court

Supreme Court created a new constitutional

to be seen as an active member of the

order in 1936 and redistributed the balance

government rather than a reactive or passive

of power between Congress and the

voice.

executive” (2018, p. 10). She hypothesizes

Fletcher’s work is well-researched,

that the Supreme Court acts as an “agent of

and she discusses many other researchers’

change” and creates new constitutional

theories and frameworks, such as Kahn’s

orders for the other branches, but particularly

constructive model, and their applicability

the executive, to follow. Each chapter breaks

and relevance to her own research. She

down an example of the Supreme Court

makes each point of her logic convincing and

doing this, in chronological order along the

draws them together to form a

developmental timeline. Fletcher begins with

cohesive whole, tied back to her overarching

the case of the United States v. Curtiss-

thesis at every possible juncture. The result

Wright Export Corporation (1936), moves on

is a beautifully crafted argument with

to the period of the Japanese internment
cases (1940s), then carries on to the case of
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compelling

reasoning

and

an

intricate

timeline she established and the impacts that

discussion of every aspect of each case.
Fletcher

does

an

excellent

it had.
job

The Collision of Political and Legal

creating a narrative that keeps the reader

Time

engaged and curious, actively interested in

comprehensive

the next steps the Court will take and the

reviews on the impact of the Supreme Court

resulting impact it will have on the executive

on the executive’s role in foreign affairs in

branch.

are

today’s academic market. Going into it with

impeccable and it is clear that she spent an

little to no knowledge of the subject, this

extensive amount of time thinking about both

reader can confidently say that it is an

the structure and the formatting of the book.

excellent source of information for any level

Fletcher’s ability to turn broad, sweeping

of prior experience, as she introduces almost

claims about the role of the Court in U.S.

all concepts on an elementary level and

government and policymaking into bite-sized

elevates them to the highest extent possible

examples in the form of easy-to-follow cases

during the duration of the reading. For

is astounding and, frankly, admirable. At

anyone interested in the Supreme Court’s

times, her attempts to write in the language

role as an agent of change in the executive’s

of academia result in word choice that is a bit

role in foreign affairs, The Collision of

beyond the reach of most readers, but this is

Political and Legal Time is an excellent place

the only criticism this book managed to

to start and finish your research, as you will

garner. Fletcher made her points and plan so

receive the answers to almost any questions

clear at the beginning of the book that the

you could possibly have in those pages.

chapters to come were easy to follow and,

Another researcher looking to take up her

instead of feeling like new territory, reminded

torch could expand on the present day

this reader of a warm welcome home.

situation, covering all cases that may have

Despite this clarity eradicating any need for

had an impact since the publishing of the

reintroduction, Fletcher made a point to

study, and discussing future implications.

Her

language

choices

provide a road map at the beginning of each
chapter and connect back to her primary
thesis multiple times throughout the text. The
outcome is a strong reinforcement of her
main points and a clear understanding of the
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is

one

of,
and

if

not

the,

most

informative

case
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Review of Cultural Backlash:

backlash

is

generational;

the

authors

Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian

structure the Interwar and Baby Boomer
generations as materialist generations more

Populism by Pippa Norris and

likely to adopt authoritarian values and

Ronald Inglehart

Generation X and Millennials as postmaterialist; less likely to support authoritarian

Jasmine VanDyke, Virginia

values. Ultimately, this hypothesis proves to

Commonwealth University

be only a partial understanding.
Norris and Inglehart utilize European
Social Survey data to develop populism and

The expansion of populist political

libertarian/authoritarian scales highlighting

rhetoric in the 21st century has sparked an

issues

imminent threat to international politics and

sides of the political spectrum are subjected

Populism, the researchers seek to rationalize

to populist rhetoric and politics. This scale is

the growing trend of Authoritarian populism
Norris

then utilized to categorize European political

and

parties

Inglehart question why individuals embrace
authoritarian

values,

and

how

support authoritarian-leaning parties and
younger generations in support of more

authoritarian

libertarian parties. Notably, populist appeals

reflex by socially conservative groups is
through

“us

versus

cross-generational differences. Regarding

them”

economic grievances, the research shows

populist rhetoric that is exacerbated by
perceived

economic

insecurity

this

of older generations being more likely to

rooted in a cultural backlash within socially

manifested

Following

results support Norris and Inglehart’s theory

authoritarian values and populist rhetoric is

This

leaders.

electoral data from generational cohorts. The

The authors hypothesize that acceptance of

groups.

and

organization step, the researchers analyze

this

embracement manifests in electoral politics.

conservative

economic

conservative parties lean authoritarian. Both

Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian

democracies.

and

liberal parties lean libertarian, and socially

Ronald Inglehart’s 2019 study, Cultural

Western

immigration

grievances. With this measurement, socially

democratic practices. In Pippa Norris and

in

of

social issues trump these concerns, making

and

them

grievances that have come about as a result

minute

embracement

of globalization. The tipping point of the

in
of

understanding

the

authoritarianism.

Furthermore, the correlation established
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through European Social Survey data is

model based on European Survey data is

extended in case studies of the 2016 election

subjective to the questions asked in the

of President Donald Trump

survey. Implementation of this scale to other

in the United States and the Brexit vote in the

states

United Kingdom. The authors focus on the

differences in political cultures.

is

also

disputable

because

of

socially conservative perspectives and the

Despite the in-depth creation and

subsequent authorization values that were

analysis of their collected data, there is not

presented through populist frameworks.

enough evidence to fully support the cultural

Similar results are seen as with the survey

backlash theory. Still, the differences that

data: the electoral results show older

were seen in the generational embracement

generations in support of Trump and Brexit

of authoritarian values remain crucial in

due to the perceived threat of cultural

understanding

changes fostering an embracement of

backsliding. Norris and Inglehart’s research

authoritarian values. Younger generations

is a starting point and the cultural backlash

are less supportive of these values but are

thesis

also found to be less likely to participate in

methodological approach must be more

electoral politics. As a result, the older

thorough.

generation’s values are more represented in
government.
Norris

and

Inglebert

supply

substantial evidence in support of their thesis
but fail to establish proper cause and effect.
There remains a distinct correlation between
the embracement of authoritarian values and
generational cohorts, but the researchers fail
to fully prove their cultural backlash theory.
Social issues are clearly important to voters
based on survey data, but Norris and
Inglebert fail to fully address differences in
generations outside of their scale. This
includes educational access, political activity
outside of electoral politics, and social
cleavages. Additionally, the application of the
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remains

trends

of

plausible,

democratic

but

the

